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With its June 2004 statement Catholics in Political Life,' the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops opened an
important and far-reaching discussion about how Catholic
individuals ought to comport themselves in political life, and-
indirectly-about how Catholic institutions-including Catholic
law schools-ought to decide whether or not to give awards,
honors, or platforms to those whose views about key moral and
political issues may differ from the views expressed in the
teachings of the Catholic Church.2 On the basis of a simple and
straightforward reading of the 2004 statement, it might appear
that the bishops wanted to say that no Catholic institution-and
thus no Catholic law school-should give awards, honors, or
platforms to those who endorse or promote views that differ from
the fundamental moral teachings of the Church.3 An important
part of the statement plainly declares: "The Catholic community
and Catholic institutions should not honor those who act in
defiance of our fundamental moral principles. They should not
be given awards, honors or platforms which would suggest
t Michael Baur holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Toronto, and
a J.D. from Harvard Law School. He is Associate Professor of Philosophy, Adjunct
Professor of Law, and Director of the Natural Law Colloquium at Fordham
University.
UNITED STATES. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Catholics in Political
Life (2004), http://old.usccb.org/bishops/catholicsinpoliticallife.shtml. Throughout the
rest of this Article, the bishops' 2004 statement Catholics in Political Life shall be
referred to simply as "the bishops' statement."
2 Id.
3 Id.
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support for their actions."4 A few moments of reflection will
reveal, however, that the issue here is somewhat more
complicated than what one might infer from a simple and
straightforward reading of the statement. The aim of the present
paper is not to settle the question of whether and how a Catholic
law school ought to give awards, honors, or platforms to certain
individuals or groups. Instead, the aim is to begin articulating
some of the underlying conceptual issues that perhaps ought to
be addressed in preparation for answering the further question of
whether and how a Catholic law school ought to give awards,
honors, or platforms to certain individuals or groups.
I. THE AUTHORITY To INTERPRET WORDS IN CHURCH
DOCUMENTS
The bishops' statement forthrightly raises worries about the
giving of awards, honors, or platforms to "those who act in
defiance of our fundamental moral principles."' It is worth
noting that the verb "to defy," in its ordinary Anglo-American
usage, does not mean the same thing as the verb "to differ."' It is
possible, after all, for an individual to endorse or promote views
that differ from what the bishops identify as "our fundamental
moral principles," without acting in defiance of those
fundamental moral principles or in defiance of the bishops
themselves. To illustrate: the fundamental moral principles that
guide my living and decisionmaking may differ-indeed, may
differ drastically-from the fundamental moral principles that
guide your living and decisionmaking; but it does not follow from
this that my endorsing and promoting of certain fundamental
moral principles must amount to any kind of defiance of you or
your fundamental moral principles. After all, I may know
absolutely nothing about you or about the fundamental moral
principles that you endorse; thus, I may be entirely ignorant
about the fact that my own "fundamental moral principles" differ
from your "fundamental moral principles." But in that case, my
endorsing of certain moral principles does not amount to an act of
4Id.
5 Id.
6 To defy is "to challenge, to combat" or "to confront with assured power of
resistance." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 327 (11th ed. 2008). To
differ is "to be unlike or distinct in nature, form or characteristics" or "to be of unlike
or opposite opinion." Id. at 348.
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"defiance" of you or your moral principles. In other words,
"defiance"-as the term is used in ordinary Anglo-American
linguistic practice--depends not only on the existence of a
difference in the beliefs or principles that are endorsed by
different individuals or groups; it depends-at a minimum-on
the fact that the defiant party knows of this difference.
Thus in its ordinary usage, the term "defiance" denotes an
informed or knowing assertion of some difference between oneself
as defying and another party as defied. More precisely: in order
to be "defiant" in the ordinary sense of the term, the defiant
party must know (1) something about his or her own actions or
commitments; (2) something about the actions or commitments of
the party being defied; and (3) that there is a meaningful
difference between these two. But even this informed or knowing
assertion of difference is not enough to qualify as "defiance" in
the ordinary sense of the word; in order for there to be "defiance"
in the ordinary sense, it must also be the case that there is some
general rule or expectation that-in most instances-would lead
the would-be defiant party to acquiesce in, or defer to, the party
being defied. "Defiance," in its ordinary usage, denotes not only
the knowing assertion of difference by the defiant party, but also
the knowing assertion of difference precisely in a context where a
lack of difference or a lack of divergence-that is, where a kind of
deference-is normally to be expected.' To illustrate: It might be
the case that the actions and commitments of devout Hindus in
India differ from the actions and commitments that some other
party-say, an American beef-producing company-would regard
as desirable. The American beef-producing company may
devoutly wish to increase its sales by convincing Hindus to give
up their beliefs and begin eating cow meat. The company's
marketing efforts might even be bound up with the most
altruistic of intentions; these efforts might be guided by the
genuine conviction that a beef-rich diet is healthier for
individuals and for the planet than is a diet altogether devoid of
It is for this reason that we speak colloquially about the "gravity-defying"
properties of gyroscopes or the death-defying feats of motorcycle daredevils. To defy
gravity is to behave in a way that diverges from the way that bodies with mass
normally-or for the most part-behave when gravitational forces are present; to
defy death is to behave in a way that diverges from the way that living things
normally-or for the most part-behave when lethal forces are present. Perhaps
fittingly, motorcycle daredevils often succeed at defying death precisely to the extent
that they also succeed at defying gravity.
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beef. Now even if the devout Indian Hindus continue to resist
the company's marketing efforts and continue to do so with
complete knowledge about what they are doing, it does not follow
that they are "defying" the beef-producing company. While they
are resisting the beef company's efforts, their resistance does not
amount to an act of "defiance," as the term is ordinarily used,
because the resistance does not take place in a context where
there is in operation some norm dictating in favor of deference or
acquiescence by the Indian Hindus. By contrast, there would be
"defiance" if an employee within the marketing department of the
beef-producing company were to resist the company's efforts to
send him to India in order to increase beef sales.
There are, then, three basic elements implied by the notion
of "defiance" as the term is ordinary used-not just difference and
a knowing difference but also a knowing difference in a context
where there is in operation some norm dictating in favor of
deference or acquiescence. Now the bishops' letter seems to
suggest that when it comes to the activities and initiatives of
Catholic universities, there is indeed in operation a norm that
dictates in favor of deference or acquiescence, and indeed
deference or acquiescence to the American Catholic bishops
themselves. But what precisely is the nature and ground of this
norm? Since the deference at issue is deference owed to the
American Catholic bishops, it appears that the norm is binding
precisely on those who are subject to the authority of the
American Catholic bishops. Now there are many ways in which
one might understand the authority of the American Catholic
bishops. For example, one might understand it as the bishops'
teaching authority, or their administrative authority, or their
canonical authority. But regardless of the many possible ways in
which one might understand this authority, is remains the case
that one can "defy" the bishops in the ordinary sense of "defy,"
only if one is subject in some way to the authority of the
bishops-which is to say, only if one is subject in some way to the
operative norm which dictates in favor of deference to or
acquiescence in the bishops' wishes or directives.
Now it is on the basis of considerations such as these that
the University of Notre Dame President John Jenkins argued, in
a letter to the Board of Trustees of the University of Notre Dame,
that Notre Dame's decision in 2009 to honor President Barack
Obama-by giving him an honorary doctor of laws degree and
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inviting him to give the university's commencement address-
was perfectly consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the
bishops' statement.8 As Fr. Jenkins writes in his letter to the
trustees, "by definition, only Catholics who implicitly recognize
the authority of Church teaching can act in 'defiance' of it."' As
our preceding reflections have shown, Fr. Jenkins is indeed quite
right to hold that it is impossible for a person to be "defiant" in
the ordinary sense of the term, if that person is not bound by
some norm dictating in favor of his or her being deferential to or
acquiescent in the wishes or directives of the party being defied.
And so in accordance with our ordinary linguistic practice, Fr.
Jenkins is right to hold that non-Catholics cannot be "defiant" in
relation to the authority of the American Catholic bishops as
such, whether the teaching authority or some other authority.
But notice the rather strange implication that would follow from
this: the implication is that the bishops' statement has nothing
whatsoever to say about the prospect of a Catholic institution's
giving of awards, honors, or platforms to non-Catholics. And if
the statement has nothing whatsoever to say about the prospect
of a Catholic institution's giving of awards, honors, or platforms
to non-Catholics, then-a fortiori-it has nothing whatsoever to
say about the prospect of a Catholic institution's giving of
awards, honors, or platforms to, say, the President of the Society
for the Annihilation of the Catholic Church. But with their
statement, did the bishops really intend to refrain from saying
anything whatsoever about such a prospect?
It seems unlikely that the bishops intended to refrain from
saying anything whatsoever about the prospect of a Catholic
institution's giving of awards, honors, or platforms to non-
Catholics. And yet the bishops' use of the word "defiance"
suggests that they were talking only about the giving of awards,
honors, or platforms to Catholics. How should this puzzle be
resolved? Bishop John D'Arcy, whose diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend includes the University of Notre Dame, has argued
that any doubts surrounding the rightful interpretation of
statements from the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops are to be resolved by the local bishop in whose diocese
8 See Margaret Fosmoe, Is ND Catholic Enough? Obama Visit Prompts
Examination of Identity, SOUTH BEND TRIB., May 10, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2248105/posts.
9 Id.
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the interpretation is to be made and applied.o Bishop D'Arcy
justifies his argument by reference to-among other things-the
Code of Canon Law, which provides that: (1) "[a] diocesan bishop
in the diocese entrusted to him has all ordinary, proper, and
immediate power which is required for the exercise of his
pastoral function except for cases which the law or a decree of the
Supreme Pontiff reserves to the supreme authority or to another
ecclesiastical authority";" and (2) "[i]t is for the diocesan bishop
to govern the particular church entrusted to him with legislative,
executive, and judicial power according to the norm of law."12
It seems to follow, then, that Bishop D'Arcy is correct to hold
that the proper interpretation of the meaning of the words in the
bishops' statement, insofar as the statement pertains to persons
and activities falling under his jurisdiction as bishop of the
diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, is to be determined by Bishop
D'Arcy himself; provided, of course, that Bishop D'Arcy's
interpretation is not contradicted or overturned by some
applicable higher authority, such as the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops or the Vatican itself. Therefore, if
Bishop D'Arcy declares that the bishops' statement is to be
interpreted as applying to the prospect of a Catholic institution's
giving awards, honors, or platforms to non-Catholics as well
as Catholics, then that declaration, unless contradicted or
overturned by a higher Church authority, is the correct one for
the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend. It remains true, as Fr.
Jenkins points out, that the term "defiance" in its ordinary usage
implies that only American Catholics can act defiantly with
respect to the American Catholic bishops. But the fundamental
question here is not the question of what the word "defiance"
means in its ordinary usage. The fundamental question at issue
is rather the question of what the word "defiance" means in the
bishops' statement, as that statement is to be interpreted and
applied within the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend. As the
Code of Canon Law suggests, the meaning of a word within
Church documents, such as the bishops' statement, is to be
"o Bishop D'Arcy: Obama Invite Caused 'Terrible Breach' Between Notre Dame
and the Church, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.
catholienewsagency.cominews/bishopdarcy obama invite causedterriblebreach b
etween notre dame and the-church/.
n1 CODEX IURIS CANONICI c.381, § 1 (Canon Law Society of America trans., 1983)
(1983).
12 See id. c.391, § 1.
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settled by the local bishop when doubts arise about the word's
meaning; 3 for it is the local bishop who holds legislative,
executive, and judicial power within his own diocese. 14 Thus, if
the bishop of the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend declares that
the word "defiance," as contained in the bishops' statement,
pertains to both Catholics and non-Catholics, then that
declaration is the correct one and ought to be followed by anyone
seeking to understand the bishops' statement as it applies within
the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend. The point here is that-
according to the Code of Canon Law and other relevant
provisions-Bishop D'Arcy's own judgment about the matter at
hand, unless contradicted or overturned by some relevant higher
authority, is itself the rule or measure for determining what is
true and correct about the matter at hand. It is for this reason
that Bishop D'Arcy's judgment about the matter at hand cannot
be wrong, unless contradicted or overturned by some relevant
higher authority. 5
Significantly, Bishop D'Arcy's interpretation is the correct
interpretation, but not because it corresponds to some true and
correct glossary of word meanings as inscribed in the usage of
ordinary American English speakers; rather, Bishop D'Arcy's
interpretation is the correct interpretation because what is at
issue is the interpretation of the meanings of words within a
statement issued by the American Catholic bishops, and the
relevant governing document, the Code of Canon Law, declares
that the local bishop has the authority to determine the
meanings of words in Church documents, when doubts arise
13 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
14 See CODEX IURIS CANONICI, supra note 11.
15 St. Thomas Aquinas makes a similar point when he observes that "a
craftsman could not err in cutting wood if his own hand were the rule for cutting."
See THOMAS AQUINAS, ON EVIL, Q.1, art. 3, reply to objection 9 (John A. Oesterle &
Jean T. Oesterle trans., University of Notre Dame Press 1995). Ludwig Wittgenstein
makes the same point, though a bit differently, when he notes that "[tihere is one
thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one
metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris." LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS: THE GERMAN TEXT WITH A REVISED ENGLISH
TRANSLATION 21 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Blackwell Publishing 2001). The reason
for this is not that the standard metre in Paris is extensionless; the reason, rather, is
that the standard metre in Paris is the rule or measure-or standard or criterion-
for determining what counts as a metre and thus for determining whether an
extended thing does or does not measure up to being a metre. Thus the standard
metre in Paris can neither succeed nor fail at measuring up to one metre; it is the
very measure for what counts as a metre in the first place. See id.
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about their meanings-unless, of course, the local bishop's
determination is preempted, contradicted, or overturned by a
higher court of appeal, which in this case might be the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops or even the Vatican. It is
worth emphasizing here that Bishop D'Arcy's interpretation is
not necessarily the correct interpretation of the bishops'
statement as the statement applies or has meaning in contexts
outside of the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend. By the same
token, Bishop D'Arcy's interpretation of non-Church
documents-for example, his interpretation of the United States
Constitution-is not necessarily the correct interpretation, even
as such documents might apply or have meaning within the
diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend. It is worth emphasizing here
that Bishop D'Arcy's interpretation of the bishops' statement is
the correct interpretation of the bishops' statement, not only
(1) because Bishop D'Arcy's interpretation is limited to persons
and activities falling under his authority as bishop of the diocese
of Fort Wayne-South Bend, but also (2) because Bishop D'Arcy is
the one who has been given due authority by the Church itself-
for example, insofar as the Church expresses itself in the Code of
Canon Law-to determine the definitive and binding meaning of
Church documents, such as the bishops' statement, in cases when
doubts about their meaning arise within the diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend. However, as previously suggested, an
interpretation given by Bishop D'Arcy is not a definitive and
binding interpretation if it is contradicted or overturned by a
higher authority, such as the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops or the Vatican itself.
II. WHY BISHOPS MAY HAVE UNIQUE AUTHORITY To RENDER
JUDGMENT ABOUT SOME THINGS, BUT NOT ABOUT OTHERS
Within the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, the word
"defiance" in the bishops' statement pertains both to Catholics
and to non-Catholics, and so the correct reading of the bishops'
statement as it pertains to the diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, is the following: "The Catholic community and Catholic
institutions should not honor those (whether Catholic or non-
Catholic) who act in defiance of our fundamental moral
principles. They should not be given awards, honors or platforms
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which would suggest support for their actions." 6 But even
though Bishop D'Arcy may be right about the meaning of the
words within the bishops' statement-and again, as it pertains to
persons and activities falling within the scope of his authority as
bishop of Fort Wayne-South Bend-it does not follow that Bishop
D'Arcy is necessarily right in his particular judgments about who
should or should not be honored by particular Catholic
institutions, even those, such as the University of Notre Dame,
within his own diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend. But why is
this so? The reason is that Bishop D'Arcy-although he has the
authority within the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend to
determine the definitive and binding meanings of words
contained within Church documents such as the bishops'
statement-does not have such authority, either within the
diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend or outside of it, to determine
whether or not it is choiceworthy for a particular university, even
a Catholic university within the diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, to give awards, honors, or platforms to certain individuals
or groups. And the reason why Bishop D'Arcy lacks this
additional kind of authority is that he, as bishop of Fort Wayne-
South Bend, is not uniquely situated or authorized to determine
the answers to two further questions. These two further
questions are: (1) the question of what it means for a university
to fulfill its purpose as a university in general and as a Catholic
university in particular, whether within the diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend or outside of it; and (2) the question of
whether particular acts of giving awards, honors, or platforms to
certain individuals or groups, even if done by Catholic
universities within the diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, do or
do not "suggest support" for the actions of such individuals or
groups.
Let us examine further why this is so. Certain individuals
within the Church may rightly possess the authority to render
definitive and decisive interpretations of the meanings of words
within governing documents, if this authority to interpret has
been established by the same legislative source which has in the
first place established the institutional entities to be governed by
such governing documents. Thus, local bishops rightly possess
the authority to render definitive and decisive interpretations of
16 Catholics in Political Life, supra note 1.
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the meanings of words within the bishops' statement as it
pertains to their individual dioceses, since this authority to
interpret has been given to them by the same legislative source
which has in the first place established the institutional entities
that they govern as bishops, namely, their local dioceses. This
common legislative source is none other than the universal
Catholic Church insofar as it establishes internal institutional
structures for itself through canon law and other provisions, and
through the creation and filling of offices in accordance with
canon law." It is through the legislative activity of the universal
Catholic Church and its officers that the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops is specifically constituted in the
way that it is and is authorized to issue the governing statements
that it issues; and it is also through the legislative activity of the
universal Catholic Church and its officers-and specifically
through canon law and further relevant provisions-that local
bishops have the authority to render definitive and decisive
interpretations of the meanings of words within the bishops'
statement as it pertains to their own dioceses, provided, of
course, that such interpretations are not contradicted or
overturned by some higher authority within the Church."
Now while American Catholic bishops have the authority to
render definitive and decisive interpretations of the meanings of
words within the bishops' statement as it pertains to their own
dioceses, they are not uniquely authorized or situated to
determine (1) what it means for a university to fulfill its purpose
as a university in general and as a Catholic university in
particular, or (2) whether particular acts of giving awards,
honors, or platforms to certain individuals or groups do or do not
"suggest support" for the actions of such individuals or groups.
The reason is that (1) the legislative source through which the
bishops have their authority as bishops is not the same as the
legislative source through which universities, and even Catholic
universities, have their existence and meaning; and (2) the
legislative source through which the bishops have their authority
as bishops is not the same as the legislative source through
which human words and gestures-including those involved in
the giving awards, honors, and platforms to others-have their
" See CODEX IURIS CANONICI, supra note 11.
1s Id. c.391, §§ 1-2.
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existence and meaning. Accordingly, it falls outside the scope of
the legislative authority of the American Catholic bishops to
determine what a university is or ought to be in general, or what
a Catholic university is or ought to be in particular, unless, of
course, the specific Catholic university in question happens to
have its existence on account of the legislative activity of the
Catholic Church or officers of the Catholic Church such as
bishops; such would be the case, for example, if the Catholic
university in question happened to be established and governed
through the legislative activity of the Holy See, as is the case
with The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.;
the Pontifical College Josephinum in Columbus, Ohio; St. Mary's
Seminary and University in Baltimore, Maryland; the Pontifical
University of St. Thomas Aquinas-"the Angelicum"-in Rome;
the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome; and the Pontifical
Lateran University in Rome.'" Stated differently: Universities,
except papally-chartered ones, do not have as their proper and
formal cause the legislative activity of the Catholic Church or its
officers. Because of this, the Catholic Church and its officers are
not uniquely situated or authorized to determine what it means
for a university, even a university that calls itself "Catholic," to
fulfill its purpose as a university.
Consider the following analogy: the Parker Brothers
Company-as maker of the game of Monopoly-is uniquely
situated and authorized to determine what one must do to play
the game of Monopoly. But the Parker Brothers Company is not
uniquely situated or authorized to determine what one must do
to solve a murder mystery, even though the Parker Brothers
1 University Facts, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, http://www.cua.
edulabout-cua/university-facts.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining that
Catholic University was founded by the U.S. Bishops); Josephinum History,
PONTIFICAL COLLEGE JOSEPHINIUM, http://www.pcj.edulaboutus/history.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining that Josephinum is placed under the protection of
the Holy See); ST. MARY'S SEMINARY & UNIVERSITY, http://www.stmarys.edul
sot/sot welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining that St. Mary's awards
degrees by authority of the Holy See); PONTIFICAL UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, http://www.angelicum.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining that
pontifical universities are chartered by the Vatican); Presentation of the University,
PONTIFICAL GREGORIAN UNIVERSITY, http://www.unigre.itfUniv/index-en.php (last
visited Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining that the university is entrusted by the Holy See);
Who We Are, PONTIFICA UNIVERSITA LATERANENSE, http://www.pul.it/?page-id=
166&lang=en (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining that Pope John XXXIII declared
the school a pontifical university).
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Company is also the maker of another game-Clue-whose object
is to solve hypothetical murder mysteries. While the Parker
Brothers Company may be uniquely situated and authorized to
determine the rules and procedures for solving some hypothetical
murder mysteries-namely, those within the game of Clue-and
while these rules and procedures may be informative and
relevant for the solving of other hypothetical murder mysteries,
it does not follow that these rules and procedures are fully
governing or uniquely authoritative for the solving of other
hypothetical murder mysteries. In a similar vein, we may say
that while the Catholic Church and its officers may be uniquely
situated and authorized to establish the guidelines for what a
papally-chartered university must do in order to fulfill its
purpose as such, and while these guidelines may be informative
and relevant for determining what other Catholic, non-papally-
chartered universities must do in order to fulfill their purposes, it
does not follow that these guidelines are fully governing or
uniquely authoritative for determining what other Catholic, non-
papally-chartered universities must do in order to fulfill their
purposes. In short, specific guidelines established by the
Catholic Church or its officers for the governance of papally-
chartered universities do not have the status of "law" for
universities which are Catholic but not papally chartered.
Guidelines that do have the status of "law" for such Catholic,
non-papally-chartered universities are to be found in the specific
charter of the university in question, in the university's
constitution and by-laws, and in local, state, and federal statues
insofar as these relate to specific elements pertinent to the
governance or conduct of the university in question.
For reasons similar to those outlined above, it also falls
outside the scope of the legislative authority of the bishops to
determine the meanings of human words in their ordinary usage
or the meanings of human gestures in their ordinary usage,
including gestures such as the giving of awards, honors, or
platforms to certain individuals or groups. For just as there are
many universities, including Catholic ones, that do not owe their
existence specifically to the legislative activity of the Catholic
Church or its officers, so too there are many human words and
gestures which, unlike the meanings of words contained in
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bishops' statements, have meanings apart from the meanings
given to them through the legislative, or any other, activity of the
Catholic Church or its officers.
III. THE PURPOSE OF UNIVERSITIES: SOME LESSONS FROM
CARDINAL NEWMAN
The Catholic Church and its officers are not uniquely
authorized or situated to determine what the proper goal or
purpose of a university-even a Catholic university-is, except,
of course, in the case of those Catholic universities that have
been established and are governed through the legislative
activity of the Catholic Church or some office or officer within the
Catholic Church. Accordingly, the determination of the proper
goal or purpose of a university, whether Catholic not, is not
simply a matter of legislative fiat by Church officers but rather a
matter of reasoning about the nature of the university as such,
and the nature and goals of particular universities that may have
unique histories, traditions, missions, and values. This sort of
reasoning-about the nature of the university as such, and about
the specific characteristics of particular universities that may
have unique aims and orientations-can in principle be made
accessible and transparent to all human beings insofar as they
are rational. Indeed, such a rational and non-authoritarian
approach to discerning the meaning and purpose of universities
is precisely the approach recommended by the Blessed John
Henry Cardinal Newman, in his now-famous reflections on the
idea of a university. As Newman suggests in the introductory
portion of his thoughts on the university, the proper
determination of what a university is as such-whether the
particular university in question be considered "Catholic" or
not-should depend on an appeal to reason as such, and not on
an appeal to authority, whether Church authority or any other
kind.20 Newman writes:
Observe then, Gentlemen, I have no intention, in any thing I
shall say, of bringing into the argument [on the idea of a
20 See JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY 18 (Frank M. Turner
ed., 1996).
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university] the authority of the Church, or any authority at all;
but I shall consider the question simply on the grounds of
human reason and human wisdom.21
When one reasons about the essential aim or purpose of a
university as such, Newman argues, one will come to the
conclusion that the university exists primarily as an intellectual
and pedagogical institution and not as a religious or moral one.
At the very beginning of The Idea of a University, Newman
provides advance notice regarding this general conclusion that he
has drawn about the nature and purpose of the university:
The view taken of a University in these Discourses is the
following-That it is a place of teaching universal knowledge.
This implies that its object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not
moral; and, on the other, that it is the diffusion and extension of
knowledge rather than the advancement. If its object were
scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a
University should have students; if religious training, I do not
see how it can be the seat of literature and science. 22
Furthermore, Newman contends, the range of what is to be
taught within a university is universal; university teaching,
properly understood, encompasses all branches of intellectual
knowledge. To restrict the range of university teaching to some
disciplines alone, or to certain areas of knowledge, is to fail to live
up to the very idea of a university. It follows from this, so
Newman argues, that if anything can be known about God, then
the intellectual study of God or a "Supreme Being"-that is,
theology-should also be part of the teaching function of a
university:
A University, I should lay down, by its very name professes to
teach universal knowledge: Theology is surely a branch of
knowledge: how then is it possible for it to profess all branches
of knowledge, and yet to exclude from the subjects of its
teaching one which, to say the least, is as important and as
large as any of them? I do not see that either premiss of this
argument is open to exception. 23
With these observations, Newman is making a point that
might seem rather counter-intuitive to modern thinkers. After
all, modern thinkers frequently regard it as obvious that Catholic
21 Id.
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id. at 25.
266
CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE
universities are distinguished from secular universities by the
fact that the teaching that is done at Catholic universities is
more limited or restricted in scope than the teaching that is done
at secular universities. Following Newman's observations, we
might well protest and assert that precisely the opposite is the
case. More specifically, we might assert that thoroughly secular
universities are more restricted in what they teach than Catholic
universities are, or should be, since thoroughly secular
universities deliberately exclude from their curricula any
teaching about God or about a "Supreme Being." Newman is
careful to remind his readers that (1) teaching about God or
about a "Supreme Being" is to be sharply distinguished from
teaching that aims at cultivating religious or devotional
sentiments in students;24 and (2) what people in a secular age
might mean by a "Supreme Being" is not necessarily the same as
what Catholics or other Christians might mean by that term.
But Newman's larger point should be sufficiently clear:
Universities such as Catholic ones that include some teaching
about God or about a "Supreme Being" are, in principle, less
restricted in their pedagogical aims than are universities, such as
thoroughly secular ones, that deliberately exclude from their
curricula certain fields or regions of intellectual discourse. To
this extent, Newman suggests, Catholic universities may well do
a better job of living up to what a university is, properly
speaking. "As to the range of University teaching," Newman
writes, "certainly the very name of University is inconsistent
with restrictions of any kind."26 Newman argues that
universities should allow intellectual discourse about God or a
"Supreme Being" in their curricula. It follows-so argues
Newman-that universities should allow intellectual discourse
about God or a "Supreme Being" in their curricula.
According to Cardinal Newman, the teaching that takes
place at universities should not be restricted to "edifying books"
or "Christian literature." Anticipating the thoughts of those who
might object to the teaching of "immoral" or "sinful" literature at
universities, Newman writes:
Some one will say to me perhaps, "Our youth shall not be
corrupted. We will dispense with all general or national
24 See id. at 30-31.
2 See id. at 36.
26 Id. at 25.
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Literature whatever, if it be so exceptionable; we will have a
Christian Literature of our own, as pure, as true, as the
Jewish." You cannot have it: -I do not say you cannot form a
select literature for the young, nay, even for the middle or lower
classes; this is another matter altogether: I am speaking of
university education, which implies an extended range of
reading, which has to deal with standard works of genius, or
what are called the classics of a language: and I say, from the
nature of the case, if literature is to be made a study of human
nature, you cannot have a Christian literature. It is a
contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless literature of a sinful
man.2 7
Newman goes further and reminds his readers that the
mission of a university is to be clearly distinguished from the
mission of a convent or a seminary. To the extent that the
university properly aims to prepare students for the world,
Newman posits, it must aid students in learning about "the ways
and principles and maxims" of the world, even if these "ways and
principles and maxims" are ultimately not worthy of being
endorsed for moral or religious reasons.
For why do we educate, except to prepare for the world? Why
do we cultivate the intellect of the many beyond the first
elements of knowledge, except for this world? Will it be much
matter in the world to come whether our bodily health or our
intellectual strength was more or less, except of course as this
world is in all its circumstances a trial for the next? If then a
University is a direct preparation for this world, let it be what it
professes. It is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place
to fit men of the world for the world. We cannot possibly keep
them from plunging into the world, with all its ways and
principles and maxims, when their time comes; but we can
prepare them against what is inevitable; and it is not the way to
learn to swim in troubled waters, never to have gone into
them.28
In a passage from his Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Newman
makes a further observation that sheds important light on his
understanding of learning and education, both within the
university and outside of it. For Newman, the airing and
discussion of ideas-even controversial ones-must be allowed to
take place free of interference from Church authorities. Such is
27 Id. at 158.
28 Id. at 160.
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not only indispensable for the discernment of truth, including
theological truth, but has-as a matter of fact-been the normal
and common mode of proceeding throughout Church history. It
is worthwhile to quote the relevant passage in full:
There was never a time when the intellect of the educated
class was more active, or rather more restless, than in the
middle ages. And then again all through Church history from
the first, how slow is authority in interfering! Perhaps a local
teacher, or a doctor in some local school, hazards a proposition,
and a controversy ensues. It smoulders or burns in one place,
no one interposing; Rome simply lets it alone. Then it comes
before a Bishop; or some priest, or some professor in some other
seat of learning takes it up; and then there is a second stage of
it. Then it comes before a University, and it may be condemned
by the theological faculty. So the controversy proceeds year
after year, and Rome is still silent. An appeal perhaps is next
made to a seat of authority inferior to Rome; and then at last
after a long while it comes before the supreme power.
Meanwhile, the question has been ventilated and turned over
and over again, and viewed on every side of it, and authority is
called upon to pronounce a decision, which has already been
arrived at by reason. But even then, perhaps the supreme
authority hesitates to do so, and nothing is determined on the
point for years: or so generally and vaguely, that the whole
controversy has to be gone through again, before it is ultimately
determined. It is manifest how a mode of proceeding, such as
this, tends not only to the liberty, but to the courage, of the
individual theologian or controversialist. Many a man has
ideas, which he hopes are true, and useful for his day, but he is
not confident about them, and wishes to have them discussed.
He is willing, or rather would be thankful, to give them up, if
they can be proved to be erroneous or dangerous, and by means
of controversy he obtains his end. He is answered, and he
yields; or on the contrary he finds that he is considered safe. He
would not dare do this, if he knew an authority, which was
supreme and final, was watching every word he said, and made
signs of assent or dissent to each sentence, as he uttered it.
Then indeed he would be fighting, as the Persian soldiers, under
the lash, and the freedom of his intellect might truly be said to
be beaten out of him.29
29 JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, APOLOGIA PRO VITA SUA AND SIX SERMONS
341-42 (Frank M. Turner ed., 2008).
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IV. THE GIVING OF AWARDS, HONORS, OR PLATFORMS BY
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES, AND THE RELEVANCE OF DOUBLE
EFFECT
Let us recall that the bishops' statement does not speak
against giving any and all honors to those, whether Catholic or
non-Catholic, who act in defiance of the bishops' fundamental
moral principles; the statement speaks, rather, against giving
awards, honors, or platforms to such persons, whether Catholic
or non-Catholic, "which would suggest support for their
actions.""o Thus we might now ask: (1) when does giving such
awards, honors, or platforms run the risk of suggesting support
for the actions of "defiant" individuals or groups?; and (2) if there
is any doubt about the matter, who is entitled or authorized to
decide whether giving awards, honors, or platforms to a
particular "defiant" party suggests support for that party's
actions?
Here, it is important to observe that the decision of a
particular Catholic university or Catholic law school to give
awards, honors, or platforms might be motivated by a number of
differing concerns. Awards, honors, or platforms might be given
to air and discuss contested topics, which, as Newman states, is
essential to the discernment of truth; to open up new channels
for political dialogue; to provide venues for the pursuit of
neglected questions or neglected truths; to call attention to
pressing social, political, or religious needs; to enhance the public
recognition or stature of the university itself; or even to gain
favor with people or groups that control large amounts of power
or financial resources.
All of these concerns seem to have been operative in the
decision by the University of Notre Dame to honor President
Obama at the university's commencement exercises in 2009.
Just as there may be a number of potential advantages to a
university's decision to give awards, honors, or platforms to
particular individuals or groups, there may also be a number of
potential disadvantages bound up with such a decision. For
example, giving awards, honors, or platforms to a particular
individual might be financially costly for the university-for
example, if an unusually high speaker's fee or unusually high
transportation costs must be paid-and it might cause
so Catholics in Political Life, supra note 1.
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embarrassment to the university-for example, if the individual
is perceived, no matter how fairly or unfairly, to be immoral,
corrupt, or unworthy of the recognition being given to him or her
by the university. Another potential disadvantage bound up with
giving awards, honors, or platforms to particular individuals or
groups is the way in which the public at large may interpret the
very act of giving the award, honor, or platform itself. As the
bishops' statement points out, when a Catholic institution gives
public recognition to certain individuals by giving awards,
honors, or platforms, there is a risk that the viewing public might
wrongly perceive such public recognition as an expression of the
Catholic institution's agreement with, or at a minimum,
indifference to, certain beliefs or policies that the individual
happens to endorse or support.
How should a "Catholic" university or a "Catholic" law school
comport itself in light of these worries and considerations? The
proper aim of those who are authorized to direct and to care for
any particular institution, such as a university or law school,
Catholic or non-Catholic, is to do what is best for the institution
and what best allows it to fulfill its proper purpose. So, all things
being equal, if giving some award, honor, or platform to a
particular individual or group is going to benefit the institution
and enable it to fulfill its proper purpose, then the institution
might be well advised to give the award, honor, or platform.
Conversely, all things being equal, if giving some award, honor,
or platform to a particular individual or group is going to harm
the institution or impede it from fulfilling its proper purpose,
then those in charge might be well advised to refrain from giving
the award, honor, or platform. In the real world, however, it is
never the case that all things are entirely equal; thus, the pursuit
of some good may be inevitably bound up with incurring some
harms, as when the decision to invite a very famous public
speaker might be bound up with especially high financial or
reputational costs for the institution. Conversely, the avoidance
of some harms may be inevitably bound up with incurring other
harms. For example, the decision to refrain from inviting a very
influential but controversial politician might end up harming the
institution's ability to win favors from the state's legislature. In
short, our real world is full of instances in which we cannot
pursue the good that we ought to pursue, without at the same
time running the risk of incurring certain evils that we ought to
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avoid. Conversely, it is full of instances in which we cannot avoid
the evils we ought to avoid, without at the same time running the
risk of incurring still further evils.
St. Thomas Aquinas famously recognized the moral
difficulties that arise when our pursuit of good is bound up with
causing evil. Thus, as Aquinas observed, it is possible for one act
to have two different effects. For example, the act of self-
preservation may have two different effects: the saving of one's
life, which is the directly intended effect, and the slaying of an
aggressor, which is an indirect or unintended effect.31  On
Aquinas's account-which has come to be known as "the doctrine
of double effect"-an act which has self-preservation as its direct
and intended object is not necessarily an illicit act, even if the
successful achievement of its object is inseparable from the
causing of some evil.3 2 The act of saving one's own life, however,
may become illicit, and thus not morally permissible, if the act-
as Aquinas says-is "out of proportion" to its proper end.33 The
act would be "out of proportion" if, for example, the individual
were to use excessive force in the otherwise legitimate act of self-
defense-for example, if the individual were to use lethal force in
order to preserve his or her life, when lesser, non-lethal force
would have been sufficient to achieve the same result of self-
preservation.34
A person may be morally justified in pursuing the intended
good, even if securing the intended good cannot be achieved
without the foreseen but unintended causing of some harm or
evil. One is not justified, however, in securing the intended good
by incurring the cost of the unintended evil or harm if there is no
proper proportionality between the goodness of the intended good
and the badness of the unintended evil or harm.
Oncologists are often faced with this type of balancing test.
Oncologists often and justifiably restore their patients to
health-an intended good-by means of chemotherapy which at
the same time and unavoidably causes in these patients nausea
and physical weakness-unintended evils. The chemotherapy
treatments are justified, however, insofar as there is a proper
at THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. II-II, Q.64, art. 7, at 1471
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947).
32 Id.
3 Id.
34 Id.
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proportionality between the goodness of preserving human life-
the directly intended good-and the relatively minor and short-
lived discomforts-unintended, though foreseen, evils-caused by
the treatment. By contrast, the chemotherapy treatments would
not be justified if there were no such proper proportionality. For
example, if saving a life through chemotherapy caused not only
short-lived discomfort in the patient being saved but also greater
harms, such as death, to several others, then there would be no
proper proportionality between the intended good and the
unintended evils brought about by the action. In such a case, the
evil of certain effects-the death of several others, even though
not directly intended-would outweigh the good of the directly
intended good-the saving of one life-and the evil would thereby
turn the otherwise licit act-of saving a life-into an illicit one.
It is important to emphasize that the doctrine of double
effect does not tell us that an action is justified just so long as its
good effects are intended and its evil or harmful effects are
unintended. If this were the substance of the doctrine, then the
doctrine would absurdly imply that a pest exterminator would be
justified in administering poison that killed both rats and
children, provided only that the killing of the rats was intended
and the killing of children was unintended. Contrary to popular
misunderstandings, the doctrine of double effect is not a doctrine
about which sorts of acts are automatically justified. Rather, it is
a doctrine about which sorts of acts are not automatically
unjustified.3 More specifically, it is a doctrine which tells us that
not all acts that produce evil or harmful consequences are
automatically unjustified; an act which produces evil or harmful
consequences may be justified, provided (1) that the evil or
harmful consequences are not intended, and (2) that there is a
proper proportionality between the good consequences that are
intended and the evil or harmful consequences that are
unintended. 6
The doctrine of double effect is not limited to extreme cases,
like killing in self-defense; it is also relevant in the most common
and mundane of human choices, including even the choice to read
a law journal article-including the present one-rather than
doing something else. This can be illustrated easily enough.
35 See id.
36 See id.
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Because human beings do not have an unlimited amount of time
in their lives, it is impossible for an individual human being to
pursue the intended good of reading a law journal article without
also refraining from pursuing other kinds of good, such as the
good of using the same time to read about physics or to get one's
grocery shopping done. As Aquinas points out, the foregoing of a
fitting good is, relatively speaking, a kind of loss or a kind of evil.
Nevertheless, an act which incidentally causes some loss or evil,
while aiming at the securing of some good, may be a justified act
provided (1) that the loss or the evil is not in itself intended, and
(2) that there is a proper proportionality between the good which
is intended-reading a law journal article-and the evil or loss
which is unintended-the foregoing of a fitting good, such as the
good of getting one's grocery shopping done. On the other hand,
an act which secures some good but at the cost of some terrible
evil or the loss of an exceedingly precious good-for example,
human life itself-may be an unjustified act. Thus, a person may
be justified if he or she chooses to spend a fixed duration of time
reading a law journal article rather than using that same fixed
duration of time to get his or her grocery shopping done. But we
would say that a person is unjustified-indeed, morally obtuse-
if he or she chooses to spend a fixed duration of time reading a
law journal article when he or she could have used that same
fixed duration of time to save the life of someone who at that very
moment happened to be nearby and choking on a piece of hard
candy.
It should be clear from the foregoing analysis that the
doctrine of double effect does not prescribe any sort of formula or
algorithm for determining which sorts of acts are justified and
which sorts are unjustified. Rather, it is a doctrine that tells us
that some acts, even if they produce evil or harmful
consequences, are not automatically unjustified acts. According
to the doctrine of double effect, judgments about the justifiability
of certain actions will depend, crucially, on judgments about the
presence or absence of a "proper proportionality" between the
intended goods and the unintended harms or evils which arise
from the actions in question. Accordingly, making moral
judgments in accordance with the doctrine of double effect does
not allow us to dispense with-but in fact requires-making
difficult prudential judgments about the relative importance of
pursuing certain goods and avoiding certain evils in our
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complicated, messy world. As we have already seen, officers of
the Church, including bishops, are not uniquely situated or
authorized (1) to determine what it means for a university to
fulfill its purpose as a university in general and as a Catholic
university in particular, unless the university is a papally-
chartered one, or (2) to determine whether particular acts of
giving awards, honors, or platforms to certain individuals or
groups do or do not "suggest support" for the actions of such
individuals or groups. It is also the case that officers of the
Church, including bishops, are not uniquely situated or
authorized (3) to make prudential judgments about the "proper
proportionality" that may or may not exist between intended
goods and unintended evils or harms that may arise when a
Catholic university or law school decides to give awards, honors,
and platforms to certain individuals or groups.
Whenever a Catholic university or law school considers
giving some award, honor, or platform to a particular individual
or group, a prudential judgment will eventually have to be made
about the relative importance of the good that might be secured
through such an act of giving and the harms or risks that might
have to be tolerated as a result of such an act. In light of a good
or a benefit that might be especially compelling for a particular
university or law school-for example, the good of recognizing the
humanitarian work of a particular alumnus/a, or the good of
instigating intellectual discussion about an especially pressing
national or local issue-a decision might legitimately be made to
tolerate certain risks that would otherwise not be tolerated-for
example, the risk of losing the support of certain alumni/ae, or
the risk of incurring criticism from local Church officers. But as
we have already seen, officers of the Church do not-except in
the case of papally-chartered institutions-normally have the
final say or the final authority to determine the relative
importance of goods to be pursued and evils to be avoided when
Catholic universities or law schools consider giving awards,
honors, or platforms. This is not to say that officers of the
Church should have no say in the matter at all. Indeed, the good
of hearing and respecting the input of relevant Church officers,
including bishops, should be one of the more compelling goods to
be considered when a Catholic institution contemplates giving
awards, honors, or platforms to certain individuals or groups.
Except in the case of papally-chartered institutions, a final
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determination regarding the relative importance of certain
intended goods and certain unintended evils-all considered in
light of the institution's particular history, traditions, values, and
concerns-is a matter to be decided not directly by Church
officers as such, but by those who have been duly charged with
caring for the good of the institution and guiding it to fulfill its
proper purpose.
